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Abstract
A community needs to be partitioned into disjoint groups;
each community member has an underlying preference over
the groups that they would want to be a member of. We are
interested in finding a stable community structure: one where
no subset of members S wants to deviate from the current
structure. We model this setting as a hedonic game, where
players are connected by an underlying interaction network,
and can only consider joining groups that are connected sub-
graphs of the underlying graph. We analyze the relation be-
tween network structure, and one’s capability to infer statisti-
cally stable (also known as PAC stable) player partitions from
data. We show that when the interaction network is a forest,
one can efficiently infer PAC stable coalition structures. Fur-
thermore, when the underlying interaction graph is not a for-
est, efficient PAC stabilizability is no longer achievable. Thus,
our results completely characterize when one can leverage the
underlying graph structure in order to compute PAC stable
outcomes for hedonic games. Finally, given an unknown un-
derlying interaction network, we show that it is NP-hard to
decide whether there exists a forest consistent with data sam-
ples from the network.
1 Introduction
A professor wants her students to complete a group program-
ming project. In order to do so, students should divide into
project groups with a few students in each; naturally, some
groups will be objectively better than others. However, stu-
dents seldom try to find a group that’s objectively optimal
for them; they would rather join groups that have at least
one or two of their friends. This type of scenario falls into
the realm of constrained coalition formation; in other words,
how should we partition a group of people given that (a) they
have preferences over the groups they are assigned to and
(b) they have limited interactions with one another? Other
scenarios fitting this description include
(a) Seating arrangements at a wedding (or at conference
banquets): some guests should absolutely not be seated
together, while others would probably enjoy one an-
other’s company. However, it should always be the case
that every guest has at least one acquaintance seated at
their table.
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(b) Group formation on social media: given a social media
network (e.g. Facebook), people prefer being affiliated
with certain groups; however, they are limited to joining
groups that already contain their friends.
Constrained coalition formation problems are often modeled
as hedonic games. Hedonic games formally capture a simple,
yet compelling, paradigm: how does one partition players
into groups, while factoring individual players’ preferences?
The literature on hedonic games is primarily focused on find-
ing “good” coalition structures — partitions of players into
disjoint groups. A set of coalition structures satisfying cer-
tain desiderata is called a solution concept. A central hedo-
nic solution concept is coalitional stability: given a coalition
structure π, we say that a set of players (also known as a
coalition) S can deviate from π if every i ∈ S prefers S to
its assigned group under π; a coalition structure π is stable if
no coalitionS can deviate. In other words,S contains at least
one player i who prefers its current coalition (denoted π(i))
to S. The set of stable coalition structures — also known
as the core of the hedonic game — may be empty; what’s
worse, even when it is known to be non-empty, finding a sta-
ble coalition structure may be computationally intractable.
Moreover, efficient algorithms for finding stable coalition
structures often assume full knowledge of the underlying he-
donic game; that is, in order to work, the algorithm needs to
have either oracle access to player preferences (i.e. queries
of the form ‘does player i prefer coalition S to coalitionT ?’),
or structural knowledge of the underlying preference struc-
ture (e.g. some concise representation of player preferences
that one can leverage in order to obtain a poly-time algo-
rithm).
Neither assumption is realistic in practice: eliciting user
preferences is notoriously difficult, especially over combina-
torially complex domains such as subsets of players. If one
forgoes preference elicitation and opts for mathematically
modeling preferences (e.g. assuming that users have addi-
tive preferences over coalition members), it is not entirely
obvious what mathematical model of user preferences is
valid. This leads us to the following natural question: can we
find a stable coalition structure when player preferences are
unknown?Recent works (Balcan, Procaccia, and Zick 2015;
Balkanski, Syed, and Vassilvitskii 2017;
Sliwinski and Zick 2017) propose a statistical approach to
stability in collaborative environments. In this framework,
one assumes the existence of user preference data over
some coalitions, which is then used to construct probably
approximately stable outcomes (the notion is referred to
as PAC stability). In this paper, we explore the relation
between structural assumptions on player preferences, and
computability of PAC stable outcomes.
Our contribution We assume that there exists some un-
derlying interaction network governing player preferences;
that is, players are nodes on a graph, and only connected
coalitions are feasible. Within this framework, we show that
if player preferences are restricted by a forest, one can com-
pute a PAC stable outcome using only a polynomial num-
ber of samples. Surprisingly, even if the underlying forest
structure is not known to the learner, PAC stabilizability still
holds, despite the fact that it may be computationally in-
tractable to find an approximate forest structure that is likely
consistent with the true interaction graph. In contrast, we
show that it is impossible to find a PAC stable outcome even
if the graph contains a single cycle. The latter result is con-
structive: we show that whenever the underlying interaction
graph does contain a cycle, one can construct a sample dis-
tribution for which it would be impossible to elicit a PAC
stable outcome.
Our positive result for forests is interesting in sev-
eral respects. First, while one can find PAC stable
outcomes in polynomial time, computing stable out-
comes for hedonic games on forests is computation-
ally intractable (Igarashi and Elkind 2016); second, unlike
(Sliwinski and Zick 2017), we do not require that player
preferences are provided in the form of numerical utilities
over coalitions. This not only makes our results more gen-
eral, but also more faithful to the problem we model, which
assumes ordinal information about player preferences, rather
than cardinal utilities. Finally, in Section 5, we prove a non-
trivial technical result on learning forest structures that is of
independent interest. Briefly, we study the following prob-
lem: we are given samples of subsets of graph vertices, each
labeled either ‘connected’ or ‘disconnected’; we need to de-
cide whether there exists some forest T ∗ that is consistent
with the sample — i.e. all connected sets of vertices are con-
nected under T ∗ and all disconnected sets are not. We show
that when all of our vertex samples are connected (i.e. we do
not observe any disconnected components), it is possible to
efficiently learn an underlying forest structure (if one exists);
on the other hand, if one assumes that both connected and
disconnected sets are presented to the learner, it is computa-
tionally intractable to decide whether there exists a forest, or
even a path, that is consistent with the samples.
Related work There exists a rich body of literature
studying hedonic games from an economic perspective (e.g.
(Banerjee, Konishi, and So¨nmez 2001; Bogomolnaia and
Jackson 2002)). More recently, the AI community has be-
gun studying both computational and analytical proper- ties
of hedonic games (see e.g. (Aziz and Brandl 2012; Deineko
and Woeginger 2013; Gairing and Savani 2010; Peters and
Elkind 2015), and (Aziz and Savani 2016; Woeginger 2013)
for an overview). Interaction networks in cooperative games
were first introduced by Myerson (1977). The relation be-
tween graph structure and stability in the classic cooperative
game setting is also relatively well-understood. Demange
(2004) shows that if the underlying interaction network is a
forest, then the core is not empty; further studies (Bousquet,
Li, and Vetta 2015; Meir et al. 2013) establish relations be-
tween approximate stability and the underlying graph struc-
ture, while Chalkiadakis, Greco, and Markakis (2016) study
the computational complexity of finding core outcomes in
graph restricted environments. Igarashi and Elkind (2016)
establish both the existence of stable coalition structures in
hedonic games over forests, as well as the computational
intractability of finding stable coalition structures; Peters
(2016) studies the relation between hedonic solution con-
cepts and the treewidth of the underlying interaction graph.
Several works study learning based game-theoretic solu-
tion concepts. Sliwinski and Zick (2017) introduce PAC
stability in hedonic games, and analyze several common
classes of hedonic games. Other works on learning and game
theory include learning in cooperative games (Balcan, Pro-
caccia, and Zick 2015; Balkanski, Syed, and Vassilvitskii
2017), rankings (Balcan, Vitercik, and White 2016), auc-
tions (Bal- can et al. 2012; Balcan, Sandholm, and Vitercik
2018; Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2016) and noncooper-
ative games (Fearnley et al. 2013; Sinha, Kar, and Tambe
2016).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, vectors are denoted by ~x, and sets
are denoted by uppercase letters; given a value s ∈ N,
we set [s] = {1, . . . , s}. A hedonic game is given by a
pair 〈N,〉, where N = [n] is a finite set of players, and
= (1, . . . ,n) is a list of preferences players in N have
over subsets of N (also referred to as coalitions); in more
detail, for every i ∈ N , we write Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S };
i describes a complete and transitive preference relation
overN〉. For each i ∈ N , let ≻i denote the strict preference
derived from i, i.e., S ≻i S′ if S i S′, but S′ 6i S. An
outcome of a hedonic game is a coalition structure, i.e., a
partition π of N into disjoint coalitions; we denote by π(i)
the coalition containing i ∈ N . A solution concept is a map-
ping whose input is a hedonic game 〈N,〉, and whose out-
put is a (possibly empty) set of coalition structures. The core
is the most fundamental solution concept in hedonic games.
First, we say that a coalition S strongly blocks a coalition
structure π if every player i ∈ S strictly prefers S to its cur-
rent coalition π(i), i.e. S ≻i π(i). A coalition structure π is
said to be core stable if no coalition S ⊆ N strongly blocks
π.
2.1 Interaction Networks
Given an undirected graphG = 〈N,E〉 whose nodes are the
player set, we restrict the space of feasible coalitions to be
the set of connected subsets of G; we denote by FE the set
of feasible coalitions. Intuitively, we restrict our attention to
coalition structures where all group members form a social
subnetwork of the underlying interaction graph. Note that
when G is a clique, all coalitions are feasible, and the result
is a standard (unrestricted) hedonic game. From now on, we
define a hedonic graph game as the tuple 〈N,, E〉; here,N
is the set of players,  their preference relations, and E the
edges of the underlying interaction network. We focus our
attention only on core stable coalition structures that consist
of feasible coalitions.
In what follows, it is useful to express player preferences
in terms of cardinal utilities. In other words, player i assigns
a value vi(S) ∈ R to every coalition S ∈ Ni; we write a
hedonic game as 〈N,V〉 where V is a collection of functions
vi : Ni → R for each i ∈ N . This representation allows
us to seamlessly integrate ideas from PAC learning into the
hedonic games model, and is indeed quite common in other
works studying hedonic games. However, as we later show,
our main result (Theorem 4.1) still holds when we transition
from a utility-based cardinal model, to a preference-based
ordinal model.
2.2 PAC Learning
We provide a brief introduction to PAC learning1. The ba-
sic idea is as follows: we are given an unknown function
v : 2N → R (a target concept in the language of PAC learn-
ing) that assigns values to subsets of players. In addition, we
are given a set ofm samples ((S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm))
where Sj ⊆ N and v(Sj) is the valuation of v over Sj ; we
wish to estimate v on subsets we did not observe.We assume
that v belongs to a hypothesis class H (say, we know that v
is an additive valuation). Our goal is to output a hypothe-
sis v∗ ∈ H (e.g. if v is additive, v∗ should be as well) that is
likely to match the outputs of v on future observations drawn
from some distribution D. More formally, a hypothesis v∗
is ǫ approximately correct w.r.t a probability distribution D
over 2N and an unknown function v if
Pr
S∼D
[v∗(S) 6= v(S)] < ǫ.
A learning algorithmA takes as inputm samples
(S1, v(S1)), (S2, v(S2)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm))
drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D over 2N , and two parame-
ters ǫ, δ > 0.
A class of functions H is (ǫ, δ) PAC (probably approxi-
mately correctly) learnable if there exists an algorithm A
that for any v ∈ H and probability distribution D over 2N ,
with probability of at least 1 − δ, it outputs a hypothesis v∗
that is ǫ approximately correct with respect to D and v. If
this holds for any ǫ, δ > 0, H is said to be PAC learnable;
moreover, if the running time of A, and the number of sam-
ples m are polynomial in 1
ǫ
, log 1
δ
and n, H is said to be
efficiently PAC learnable.
The value δ is the confidence parameter: intuitively, it
is the probability that the random samples drawn from D
do not accurately portray the true sample distribution; for
example, if D is the uniform distribution, then it is possi-
ble (though unlikely) that we draw the same subset in ev-
ery one of our m samples. The value ǫ is called the er-
ror parameter: it is the likelihood that our hypothesis v∗
1What we show here is but one of many variants on the the-
ory of PAC learning. There are many excellent sources on this
classic theory; we refer our reader to (Anthony and Bartlett 1999;
Kearns and Vazirani 1994; Shashua 2009)
does not agree with the target concept v. Not all hypothe-
sis classes are efficiently PAC learnable; learnability is in-
herently related to the complexity of the hypothesis class.
The complexity of real-valued functions is commonly mea-
sured using the notion of pseudo dimension (see e.g. Chap-
ter 11 of (Anthony and Bartlett 1999)). Given a list of sets
S1, . . . , Sm ⊆ N , and corresponding values r1, . . . , rm ∈
R we say that a class of functions H can pseudo-shatter
(Sj , rj)
m
j=1 if for any labeling ℓ1, . . . , ℓm ∈ {0, 1}, there
is some v ∈ H such that v(Sj) ≥ rj iff ℓj = 1. The pseudo-
dimension ofH, denoted Pdim (H) is
max{m | ∃ (Sj , rj)
m
j=1 that can be shattered byH}.
The following well-known theorem relates the pseudo-
dimension and PAC learnability.
Theorem 2.1 ((Anthony and Bartlett 1999)). A class
of functions H is efficiently (ǫ, δ) PAC learnable
using m = poly(Pdim (H),
1
ǫ
, log 1
δ
) samples if
there exists an algorithm such that given m samples
(S1, v(S1)), (S2, v(S2)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm)) drawn i.i.d.
from a distribution D, it outputs v∗ ∈ H consistent with
the sample, i.e. v∗(Sj) = v(Sj) for all sampled Sj , and
runs in time polynomial in 1
ǫ
, log 1
δ
and m. Furthermore, if
Pdim(H) is superpolynomial in n,H is not PAC learnable.
In other words, in order to establish the PAC learnabil-
ity of some hypothesis class, it suffices that one shows that
its pseudo dimension is low, and that there exists some effi-
cient algorithm that is able to output a hypothesis v∗ which
matches the outputs of v on all samples. We note that even
if an efficient consistent algorithm does not exist (e.g. if the
problem of matching a hypothesis to the samples is compu-
tationally intractable), a low pseudo dimension is still desir-
able: it implies that the number of samples needed in order
to find a good hypothesis is polynomial.
2.3 PAC Stabilizability
When studying hedonic games, one is not necessarily inter-
ested in eliciting approximately accurate user preferences
over coalitions using data; in our case, we are interested
in identifying core stable coalition structures. Intuitively,
it seems that the following idea might work: first, infer
player utilities from data and obtain a PAC approximation
of the original hedonic game; next, find a coalition struc-
ture that stabilizes the approximate hedonic game. This ap-
proach, however, may be overcomplicated: first, it may be
impossible to PAC learn player preferences from data (this
depends on the hypothesis class); moreover, computing a
core coalition structure for the learned game may be com-
putationally intractable. (Sliwinski and Zick 2017) propose
learning a stable outcome directly from data. They intro-
duce a statistical notion of core stability for hedonic games,
which they term PAC stability (this term was first used by
(Balcan, Procaccia, and Zick 2015) for cooperative transfer-
able utility games).
We say that a partition π is ǫ-PAC stable w.r.t. a probabil-
ity distribution D over 2N if
Pr
S∼D
[S strongly blocks π] < ǫ.
The inputs to our learning algorithms will be samples
(S1, ~v(S1)), (S2, ~v(S2)), . . . , (Sm, ~v(Sm)),
where S1, . . . , Sm ⊆ N , and ~v(Sj) is a vector describing
players’ utilities over Sj ; that is, ~v(Sj) = (vi(Sj))i∈Sj .
Given an unknown hedonic game 〈N,V〉 belonging to
some hypothesis class H, a PAC stabilizing algorithm A
takes as inputm sets S1, . . . , Sm sampled i.i.d. from a distri-
bution D, and players’ preferences over the sampled sets; in
addition, it receives two parameters ǫ, δ > 0. The algorithm
A PAC stabilizes H, if for any hedonic game 〈N,V〉 ∈ H,
distributionD over 2N , and parameters ǫ, δ > 0, with proba-
bility ≥ 1− δ,A outputs an ǫ-PAC stable coalition structure
if it exists; again, if the running time of the algorithmA and
the number of samples, m, are bounded by a polynomial in
n, 1
ǫ
and log 1
δ
, then we say that A efficiently PAC stabilizes
H. Similarly, we say that H is (efficiently) PAC stabilizable
if there is some algorithmA that (efficiently) PAC stabilizes
H.
3 Learning Hedonic Graph Games
In what follows we consider the following hypothesis class.
Definition 3.1. For an undirected graph G = 〈N,E〉, let
HG be the class of all hedonic games 〈N,V〉 where for each
player i ∈ N , vi({i}) = 0 and player i strictly prefers its
singleton to any disconnected coalition S ∈ Ni \ FE , i.e.,
vi(S) < 0 for all S ∈ Ni \ FE .
We first present a baseline negative result: fixing a for-
est G, the hypothesis class, HG is not efficiently PAC learn-
able. When referring to the PAC learnability of any class
of hedonic games, we mean inferring some utility function
v∗i : 2
N → R for all i ∈ N that PAC approximates the
true utilities of players in N . This approximation guarantee
can be interpreted in both an ordinal and cardinal manner.
If we are given player i’s ordinal preferences, this simply
means that v∗i is consistent with the ordinal preferences; if
we are given player i’s cardinal utility function vi, v
∗
i should
be a PAC approximation of vi. As Theorem 3.2 shows, even
when we are given additional information about the underly-
ing graph interaction network, players’ preferences are not
PAC learnable.
Theorem 3.2. For any graph G = 〈N,E〉 with exponen-
tially many connected coalitions, the class HG is not effi-
ciently PAC learnable.
Proof. Recall thatFE is the set of all feasible coalitions over
G = 〈N,E〉; by assumption, |FE | is exponential. Let Hi
be the set of all possible utility functions vi : Ni → R
satisfying vi({i}) = 0 and v(S) < 0 for all disconnected
coalition S ∈ Ni \FE . The utility player i derives from fea-
sible coalitions inG is unrestricted; in particular, one cannot
deduce anything about the utility of some feasible coalition
S ∈ FE , based on other feasible coalitions’ utilities. This
immediately implies that the set FE can be pseudo-shattered
byHi. Hence Pdim(Hi) is at least exponential, and by The-
orem 2.1, Hi is not efficiently PAC learnable.
As an immediate corollary, forest interaction structures do
not admit PAC learnable preference structures in general;
this is true even if G is a star graph over n players, since
the number of feasible coalitions is exponential in n.
Corollary 3.3. Let G be a star graph over n players; then
HG is not PAC learnable.
Proof. For a star with n nodes, any coalition containing the
center of the star is feasible, hence it has 2n−1 feasible coali-
tions. By Theorem 3.2, hedonic games on forests are not
PAC learnable.
The reason that hedonic games with forest interaction
structures are not PAC learnable is that they may have ex-
ponentially many feasible coalitions; this is also the rea-
son that finding a core stable coalition structure for hedonic
games with forest interaction structures is computationally
intractable (Igarashi and Elkind 2016). However, we now
show how one can still exploit the structural properties of
forest graph structures to efficiently compute PAC stable out-
comes.
4 PAC Stabilizability of Hedonic Graph
Games
Having established that hedonic games with a forest inter-
action structure are not, generally speaking, PAC learnable,
we turn our attention to their PAC stabilizability. We divide
our analysis into two parts. We begin by assuming that the
underlying interaction graph structure G is known to us; in
other words, we know that our game belongs to the hypothe-
sis class HG. In Section 5, we show how one can forgo this
assumption.
Theorem 4.1. If G = 〈N,E〉 is a forest, HG is efficiently
PAC stabilizable.
Proof. We claim that Algorithm 1 PAC stabilizes HG. It
is related to the algorithm introduced in Demange (2004)
used to find core stable outcomes for forest-restricted he-
donic games2 in the full information setting. Intuitively, in-
stead of identifying the guaranteed coalition for each player
precisely, Algorithm 1 approximates it. If the input graph
〈N,E〉 is a forest, we can process each of its connected com-
ponents separately, so we can assume that 〈N,E〉 is a tree.
We first provide an informal description of our algo-
rithm, followed by pseudocode. The algorithm first trans-
forms 〈N,E〉 into a rooted tree with root r by orienting the
edges in E towards the leaves. For every player i starting
from the bottom to the top, the algorithm identifies Bi - a
coalition containing i, the best for i observed in the sam-
ples that is entirely contained in i’s subtree, such that oth-
ers in Bi prefer it to their own best guaranteed coalition; in
other words, Bi j Bj for all j ∈ Bi. Having identified
Bi for every i ∈ N , players are partitioned according to the
Bi’s from top-down. The main concern is to ensure that Bi
2Demange (2004) presents the algorithm for non-transferable
cooperative utility games on trees where each coalition has a choice
of action. A hedonic game is a special case of a non-transferable
utility game where each coalition has a unique action.
is a good approximation of its full-information counterpart;
this is guaranteed by taking a sufficiently large sample size
m = ⌈n
ǫ
log n
δ
⌉.
In what follows, we assume an orientation of the trees in
G, with arbitrary root nodes. Fixing the orientation, we let
desc(i) be the set of descendants of i (we assume that i ∈
desc(i)). For each coalition S ⊆ N , we denote by child(S)
the set of children of S, namely,
child(S) = { i ∈ N \ S | i’s parent belongs to S }.
The height of a node i ∈ N is defined inductively as follows:
height(i) := 0 if i is a leaf, i.e., desc(i) = {i}, and
height(i) := 1 +max{ height(j) | j ∈ desc(i) \ {i} },
otherwise.
Algorithm 1An algorithm finding a PAC stable outcome for
forest-restricted games
Input: set S ofm = ⌈n
ǫ
log n
δ
⌉ samples from D
Output: a partition π = π(r) of N
1: Make a rooted tree with root r by orienting all the edges
in E towards the leaves.
2: Initialize Bi ← ∅ and π(i) ← ∅ for each i ∈ N .
3: for t = 0, . . . , height(r) do
4: for each node i ∈ N with height(i) = t do
5: set S∗ = {S ∈ S ∩ FE | i ∈ S ⊆
desc(i) ∧ vj(S) ≥ vj(Bj), for all j ∈ S\{i} }∪{{i}}
6: choose Bi ∈ argmax{ vi(S) | S ∈ S∗ ∪ {{i}} }
7: set π(i) ← {Bi} ∪
⋃
{ π(j) | j ∈ child(Bi) }
8: end for
9: end for
Given player i, let Bi be the collection of coalitions Bj
for every descendant j 6= i of i, i.e., Bi = {Bj | j ∈
desc(i) \ {i} }. For each i ∈ N and each coalition X ⊆ N ,
we let PBi(X) mean that i ∈ X ⊆ desc(i), X is connected,
and every other player j in X \ {i} weakly prefers X to
Bj . Now, we define a modified preference order for player i,
Bi , that devalues any coalition X for which PBi(X) does
not hold.
• If PBi(X) and PBi(Y ), thenX ≻Bi Y ⇐⇒ X ≻i Y
• If PBi(X) but ¬PBi(Y ), thenX ≻Bi Y
• If ¬PBi(X), then ∀Y : Y Bi X
Given Bi and a distribution D, we say that a coalition X
is top- ǫ
n
for player i, if
Pr
S∼D
[S ≻Bi X ] ≤
ǫ
n
.
Trivially, for every Bi the probability of sampling a top-
ǫ
n
coalition for player i from D is at least ǫ
n
; moreover, if
Pr
S∼D
[PBi(S)] ≤
ǫ
n
, then any coalition is top- ǫ
n
.
Intuitively, Bi approximates the best coalition i can form
with members of the subtree rooted at i. Algorithm 1’s objec-
tive is to ensure that sampling a coalition S fromD such that
PBi(S)∧S ≻i Bi is unlikely, namely, the probability of see-
ing S fromD such that S is better for the highest node i in S
than Bi, and every other player in S prefers it to their Bj , is
smaller than ǫ; this is done by examining enough coalitions
so as to see some top- ǫ
n
coalition for every player.
Examine what happens if Bi containing Bj’s for i’s de-
scendants is fixed upfront, i.e. not dependent on the sample.
Let us bound the probability that for i, none of the coalitions
in S are top- ǫ
n
:(
1−
ǫ
n
)m
=
(
1−
ǫ
n
)⌈n
ǫ
log n
δ
⌉
(1)
≤
((
1−
ǫ
n
)n
ǫ
)log n
δ
<
(
1
e
)log n
δ
<
δ
n
Note that Inequality (1) is true irrespective of whatBi is. Tak-
ing a union bound, the probability that there is some player
i such that there is no top- ǫ
n
coalition for i in S is at most
δ. Note that S∗ can end up not containing any coalition (line
5). But then with high confidence, as a special case of the
above consideration, every coalition is top- ǫ
n
, and the algo-
rithm can pick {i}.
Recall that in an actual run of the algorithm the sample S
is drawn, and for every descendant j of i, Bj is computed
based on S, and then Bi is computed based on the same
sample. One can ask whether some dependence between the
computation of Bi and the Bj’s does not invalidate Inequal-
ity (1). This potential problem can be easily solved by taking
a larger number of samples: if we takem = ⌈n
2
ǫ
log n
δ
⌉ sam-
ples, we can just use n
ǫ
log n
δ
samples to compute each Bi
and maintain complete independence in the samples.
In order to see the smaller sample size used in Algorithm 1
provides the same guarantee, consider an equivalent reorder-
ing of the computation ofBi andBj’s: first, for every i ∈ N ,
determine the number k of connected coalitions S in the
sample such that i will be the highest node in S. Then, draw
the other m − k coalitions and compute Bj’s for every de-
scendant j of i; finally, based on this, determine the family
Bi. Note that regardless of what Bi is, each of the undeter-
mined, independently drawn k coalitions has probability of
at least ǫ
n
to be top- ǫ
n
for i. Hence, the inequality (1) holds
even if Bi and Bi are computed based on the same sample
of coalitions S.
We are now ready to prove that the coalition structure out-
putted by Algorithm 1 returns a PAC stable outcome π(r).
We observe that any coalition included in the returned π(r)
is a Bi for some i. Note that for every j ∈ Bi, we have
that vj(Bi) ≥ vj(Bj) (line 5). Now, consider any coalition
X that strongly blocks π(r); let i = argmaxj∈Xheight(j).
SinceX strongly blocks π(r),
vj(X) > vj(π
(r)(j)) ≥ vj(Bj)
for all players j ∈ X . In particular, vi(X) > vi(Bi). By
construction of Bi and Inequality (1), Bi is top-
ǫ
n
for i; that
is,
ǫ
n
> Pr
S∼D
[vi(S) > vi(Bi)] ≥ Pr
S∼D
[S = X ];
thus the probability of drawing a coalition such as X
from D, i.e. strongly blocking π(r) and having i =
argmaxj∈Xheight(j), is less than
ǫ
n
. Taking a union bound
over all players,
Pr
X∼D
[X strongly blocks π(r)] < ǫ;
this guarantee holds with confidence 1− δ.
We conjecture that a similar argument can imply a
stronger statement. That is, we can replace ‘strongly block’
in the definition of PAC stabilizability with ‘weakly block’
and still obtain PAC stabilizability on trees. (A coalition S
weakly blocks a coalition structure if every player weakly
prefers S to their current coalition and at least one player in
S has a strict preference) We note that in the full informa-
tion setting, a strict core outcome does not necessarily exist
on trees (Igarashi and Elkind 2016).
Remark 4.2 (From Cardinal to Ordinal Preferences). Note
that step 6 of the Algorithm 1 is the only step that refers
to the numerical representation of agent preferences vi.
The algorithm chooses a coalition with maximal utility
value vi out of some set of possible coalitions; in par-
ticular, the only thing required for the successful imple-
mentation of Algorithm 1 is players’ ranking of coalitions
in the sample. In other words, the particular numerical
representation of player preferences plays no role. This
is a significant departure from the algorithms devised by
(Sliwinski and Zick 2017), where the type of utility repre-
sentation functions used was crucial for PAC stability.
Next, we show that Theorem 4.1 is ‘tight’ in the sense that
if the graphG contains a cycle,HG is not PAC stabilizable.
Theorem 4.3. Given a non-forest graph G = 〈N,E〉, the
classHG is not PAC stabilizable.
Proof. SinceG is not a forest, there is a cycle inG. Without
of loss of generality, let C = {1, 2, . . . , k} be a cycle with
{i, i + 1} ∈ E for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, and {k, 1} ∈ E.
Let S1 = {1, 2}, S2 = {2, 3}, S3 = {3, . . . , k, 1}. Suppose
D is the uniform distribution on {S1, S2, S3} and that the
following holds:
S1 ≻1 S3, S2 ≻2 S1, S3 ≻3 S2. (2)
In this case, nothing beyond (2) can be deduced about the
game by examining samples fromD. Consider the following
games satisfying (2):
• A game Γ1 where every player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} strictly
prefers {i} to any other coalition, and any non-singleton
coalition is less preferred than Si and Si−1, namely,
{i} ≻i Si ≻i Si−1 ≻i S
′ for any S′ ∈ Ni \
{Si, Si−1, {i}}. Here we set S0 = S3. Every player
j ∈ S3 strictly prefers S3 to any other coalition.
• A game Γ2 where every player in C strictly prefers
C = {1, 2, ..., k} to any other coalition, and every player
i ∈ {1, 2, 3} strictly prefers Si to any coalition other than
C. Every player j ∈ S3 strictly prefers S3 to any other
coalition other than C.
Suppose towards a contradiction that there is an algorithm
A that returns a 13 -PAC stable partition π. We will show that
for π to be resistant against deviations supported byD, π has
to include {1} or {2} or {3} for the first game, andC for the
second game, which implies that it is impossible to achieve
ε < 13 with any confidence 1− δ > 0.
• Consider the first game Γ1. Suppose for a contradiction
that no player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} forms a singleton. We will
show that at least one of S1, S2, and S3 would strongly
block π with probability 1. The claim is clear when no
player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} belongs to Si; thus suppose at least
one of Si is formed. Then we have the following three
cases.
– If π(1) = S1, π(2) = S1, and π(3) 6= {3}, then players
in S2 strictly prefer S2 to their own coalitions.
– If π(2) = S2, π(3) = S2, and π(1) 6= {1}, then players
in S3 strictly prefer S3 to their own coalitions.
– If π(j) = S3 for all j ∈ S3, and π(2? = {2}, then
players in S1 strictly prefer S1 to their own coalitions.
In either case, π is strongly blocked with probability at
least 13 , a contradiction.
• Consider the second gameΓ2. Suppose for a contradiction
that the coalition C is not formed, i.e., C 6∈ π. Again, at
least one of Si is formed as otherwise π would not be
resistant against deviations supported byD. Now we have
the following three cases.
– If π(1) = S1, π(2) = S1, then players in S2 strictly
prefer S2 to their own coalitions.
– If π(2) = S2, π(3) = S2, then players in S3 strictly
prefer S3 to their own coalitions.
– If π(j) = S3 for all j ∈ S3, then players in S1 strictly
prefer S1 to their own coalitions.
In either case, π is strongly blocked with probability at
least 13 , a contradiction.
5 Inferring Tree Interaction Networks from
Data
Until now, we assume that the underlying interaction net-
work G was given to us as input; this is, naturally, an as-
sumption that we would like to forgo. Suppose the underly-
ing graph is a forest T = 〈N,E〉, and consider the question
of whether it is possible to infer a forest T ∗ = 〈N,E∗〉 that
agrees with the original graph with high probability. Let Tn
be the set of all possible trees over n vertices, and let Fn be
the set of all possible forests; Fn is our hypothesis class for
guessing an approximate forest. More formally, Fn consists
of functions fG that given an n vertex forest G, output 1 if
a set of vertices is connected, and 0 otherwise. By Cayley’s
formula:
|Tn| = n
n−2 (3)
Any forest can be obtained by choosing a tree, and then
choosing a subset of its edges, hence:
|Fn| ≤ |Tn|2
n−1 = nn−22n−1 (4)
We observe the following variant of Theorem 2.1 for finite
hypothesis classes.
Theorem 5.1 (Anthony and Bartlett (1999)). Let C be a fi-
nite hypothesis class where log |C| is polynomial in n. If
there exists a polynomial time algorithm that for any v ∈ C,
and samples
〈S1, v(S1)〉 . . . , 〈Sm, v(Sm)〉
finds a function v∗ ∈ C consistent with the samples, i.e.,
v∗(Sj) = v(Sj) for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then C is effi-
ciently PAC learnable.
Since log |Fn| < 2n logn, all we need is to establish the
existence of an efficient algorithm to compute a forest con-
sistent with a given sample. More formally, let T be an un-
known forest; we are given a set of m subsets of vertices
labeled ’connected’ or ’disconnected’ according to T , can
we find a forest that is consistent with the labeling? First,
we consider an easier question and assume all subsets are
connected. The answer to this question is affirmative, and
appears in Conitzer, Derryberry, and Sandholm (2004).
Theorem 5.2 (Conitzer, Derryberry, and Sandholm (2004)).
Let T = 〈N,E〉 be a tree. Given a list S1, . . . , Sm of con-
nected vertices in T , there exists a poly-time algorithm that
outputs a tree T ∗ where every subset Sj is connected in T
∗.
Theorem 5.2 pertains to trees, but immediately general-
izes to forests by noting that if T is a forest, any tree whose
edgeset is a superset of E is a valid solution as well, hence
the same algorithm solves the problem.
In other words, if one only observes subsets of feasible
coalitions and players’ preferences over them, it is possible
to find a forest structure consistent with the samples.
Corollary 5.3. If the probability distribution D supports
only connected subgraphs, Fn is efficiently PAC learnable
over D.
Corollary 5.3 is immediately implied by (4), Theorems
5.1 and 5.2. Theorem 4.1 assumes that the underlying inter-
action graph is known to us. Leveraging Corollary 5.3, we
now show that this assumption can be forgone; that is, it is
possible to PAC stabilize a hedonic game whose underlying
interaction graph is a forest, even if the forest structure is un-
known to us. Note that we established that the forest struc-
ture can be PAC learned efficiently only if the sample con-
tains exclusively connected coalitions, yet we do not have
this requirement for PAC stabilizability.
Theorem 5.4. Let H∗ =
⋃
{HG | G is a forest } be the
class of all hedonic games whose interaction graph is a for-
est; thenH∗ is efficiently PAC stabilizable.
Proof. Suppose ε, δ are given, and there is an unknown
forest G, hedonic game 〈N,V〉 ∈ HG and a probability
distribution D over coalitions. Let D′ be a distribution ob-
tained from D by substituting any disconnected coalitions
with ∅. D′ supports only connected coalitions, so by Corol-
lary 5.3, G can be efficiently PAC learned with respect to
D′ to obtain G′ s.t. PrS∼D′ [fG′(S) 6= fG(S)] <
ǫ
2 with
confidence 1 − δ2 . Let D
′′ be a distribution obtained from
D′ by substituting any coalitions S s.t. fG′(S) 6= fG(S)
with ∅. Since fG′(S) = fG(S) for any S supported by D′′,
by Theorem 4.1, given G′, 〈N,V〉 can be PAC stabilized
with respect to D′′ to obtain a partitioning of the agents
π such that PrS∼D′′ [S strongly blocks π] <
ǫ
2 with confi-
dence 1− δ2 . For ease of notation, we write dev (S, π) when-
ever S strongly blocks π.
Pr
S∼D
[dev (S, π)] = Pr
S∼D
[dev (S, π) ∧ S is connected in G]
= Pr
S∼D′
[dev (S, π)]
= Pr
S∼D′
[dev (S, π) ∧ fG′(S) = fG(S)]
+ Pr
S∼D′
[dev (S, π) ∧ fG′(S) 6= fG(S)]
≤ Pr
S∼D′
[dev (S, π) ∧ fG′(S) = fG(S)] +
ε
2
(5)
= Pr
S∼D′′
[dev (S, π)] +
ε
2
≤
ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε
(6)
By construction of G′ and π, lines (5) and (6)
hold with confidence 1 − δ2 each. We conclude that
PrS∼D[S strongly blocks π] ≤ ε with confidence at least
1−δ. Since the constructions ofG′ and π both require a poly-
nomial number of samples from D, H∗ is efficiently PAC
stabilizable.
Theorem 5.2, while interesting in its own right, provides
us with only a partial understanding of the problem: if all
one is given is positive examples, it is possible to find a tree
structure that is consistent with all connected coalitions. In
what follows, we study a more general question of whether
we can find a forest consistent with both positive (connected
coalitions) and negative (disconnected coalitions) examples.
As we show in Theorem 5.5, introducing the possibility of
negative examples makes the problem computationally in-
tractable, even if we restrict ourselves to the hypothesis class
of paths. Hence, forests cannot be PAC learned efficiently. It
is interesting to note that Theorem 5.4 could be achieved de-
spite this negative result.
5.1 The Complexity of Constructing Consistent
Trees
We now argue that deciding whether there exists a forest
consistent with both positive and negative examples is com-
putationally intractable; in fact, this claim holds even when
the desired forest is a path. This result stands in sharp con-
trast to known computational results in the literature; indeed,
there are several efficient algorithms for such restricted
networks when only connected coalitions are taken into ac-
count 3 (Booth and Lueker 1976; Korte and Mo¨hring 1987;
Corneil, Olariu, and Stewart 1998;
Fulkerson and Gross 1965; Habib et al. 2000;
Kratsch et al. 2006; Hsu and Ma 1999).
3The problem of deciding the existence of a path consistent with
connected coalitions is equivalent to the problem of determining
whether the intersection graph of a hypergraph is an interval, which
is also closely related to testing the consecutive ones property of a
matrix (see, e.g. the survey by Dom (2009) for more details).
Specifically, we are given m samples of node subsets
S1, . . . , Sm; each subset Sj is labeled by a function ℓG such
that
ℓG(Sj) =
{
1 if Sj is connected in G
0 otherwise.
(7)
We say that a graph G∗ = 〈V,E∗〉 is consistent with G =
〈V,E〉 over the samples S = {S1, . . . , Sm} ⊆ V if and
only if ℓG∗(Sj) = ℓG(Sj) for all j ∈ [m]. Our objective
is to find a forest T ∗ such that ℓT∗(Sj) = ℓG(Sj) for all j.
Theorem 5.5 states that it is NP-hard to determine whether
such a graph exists.
Theorem 5.5. Given a family of subsets S ⊆ 2N such that
each set in S is of size at most 3, and a mapping ℓ : S →
{1, 0}, it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists a path
T ∗ = 〈N,E〉 such that ℓT∗(S) = ℓ(S) for each S ∈ S. The
result also holds when T ∗ is a forest.
Proof. We will first show that it is NP-hard to decide
whether there exists a path consistent with both positive and
negative samples; later we will show that how the reduction
can be extended to forests.
Our reduction is from a restricted version of 3SAT.
Specifically, we consider (3,B2)-SAT. Recall that in this
version of 3SAT, each clause contains at most 3 liter-
als, and each variable occurs exactly twice positively and
twice negatively; this problem is known to be NP-complete
(Berman, Karpin´ski, and Scott 2004).
Idea: consider a formula φ with a variable set X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} and clause set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm},
where for each variable xi ∈ X we write xi(1) and xi(2) for
the two positive occurrences of xi, and x¯i(1) and x¯i(2) for
the two negative occurrences of x. We will have one clause
gadget Cj = {cj(1), cj(2)} for each clause cj ∈ C and
one variable gadget Vi = {vi(1), vi(2)} for each variable
xi ∈ X . Most player arrangements will be inconsistent with
the pair 〈S, ℓ〉 unless the following holds:
• For each clause cj ∈ C, a literal player contained in a
clause cj connects the players from a clause gadget.
• For each variable xi ∈ X , either the pair of positive literal
players xi(1), xi(2) or the pair of negative literal players
x¯i(1), x¯i(2) connects the players from a variable gadget.
Hence, one can think of the variable gadgets as forcing
a path to make a choice between setting xi true and setting
xi false; each clause gadget ensures that the resulting assign-
ment is satisfiable.
Construction details: For each variable xi ∈ X , we intro-
duce two variable players vi(1) and vi(2), and four literal
players
xi(1), xi(2), x¯i(1), x¯i(2),
which correspond to the four occurrences of x. For each
clause cj ∈ C, we introduce two clause players cj(1) and
cj(2). Let k := (4n − m − 2n) + 1 = 2n − m + 1. We
introduce k garbage collectors g1, g2, . . . , gk, and two leaf
players s and t. Intuitively, garbage collectors will be used
to connect the literal players that do not appear in any clause
or variable gadget.
Our set S of samples consists of three subfamilies C, U2,
and U3: the sets in C correspond to the connectivity con-
straints, the sets in U2 correspond to disconnected coalitions
of size 2, and the sets in U3 correspond to disconnected coali-
tions of size 3.
First, we construct the set C that constitutes of
• the four pairs {s, c1(1)}, {cm(2), v1(1)}, {vn(2), g1},
{gk, t};
• the consecutive pairs {cj(2), cj+1(1)} for j ∈ [m − 1];
and
• the consecutive pairs {vi(2), vi+1(1)} for i ∈ [n− 1].
We next construct the negative samples U2 and U3 as fol-
lows. The family U2 is the set of all player pairs, except for
the following:
• the pairs in C.
• the pairs of a variable player and its corresponding lit-
eral player, i.e., the pairs of the form {vi(h), xi(h)} or
{vi(h), x¯i(h)}.
• the pairs of a clause player and a literal player contained
in it, i.e., the pairs of the form {cj(h), y} where y is a
literal player in a clause cj .
• the pairs of positive literal players or negative literal
players of each variable, i.e., the pairs of the form
{xi(1), xi(2)} or {x¯i(1), x¯i(2)}.
• the pairs of a literal player and a garbage collector, i.e.,
the pairs of the form {xi(h), gk′} or {x¯i(h), gk′}.
In a path consistent with the samples, each variable player
can share an edge with its literal player; and each clause
player can share an edge with a literal player contained in
it.
The family U3 consists of the following player triples:
• triples of the form {vi(1), xi(1), y} where y 6=
vi−1(2) and y 6= xi(2), and the triples of the form
{vi(1), x¯i(1), y} where y 6= vi−1(2) and y 6= x¯i(2); and
• the triples of the form {xi(1), xi(2), y} where y 6=
vi(1) and y 6= vi(2), and the triples of the form
{x¯i(1), x¯i(2), y} where y 6= vi(1) and y 6= vi(2).
Here v0(2) = cm(2) and c0(2) = s. The above constraints
mean that if a variable player vi(1) and its positive literal
player xi(1) (respectively, its negative literal player x¯i(1))
are adjacent, then the player xi(1) can be only adjacent to
the other positive literal player xi(2) (respectively, the other
negative literal player x¯i(2)), which can then be only adja-
cent to the other variable player vi(2).
Finally, for each S ∈ S we set ℓ(S) = 1 if and only
if S ∈ C. Note that the number of players in the instance
is bounded by O(n + m) and the number of sets in S is
bounded by O(n2 +m2).
Correctness: We will now show that φ is satisfiable if and
only if there exists a path consistent with 〈S, ℓ〉.
=⇒: Suppose that there exists a truth assignment f : X →
{true, false} that satisfies φ. First, since f is a satisfiable as-
signment for φ, for each clause gadget Cj = {cj(1), cj(2)},
we can select exactly one literal that satisfies a clause cj ;
we connect the literal player with each of the clause players
cj(1) and cj(2) by an edge. We combine all the clause gad-
gets by constructing an edge {cj(2), cj+1(1)} for each j ∈
[m−1]. Now, we consider an assignment that gives the oppo-
site values to f , and connect each variable gadget using the
literals corresponding to this assignment. Specifically, for
each variable gadget Vi = {vi(1), vi(2)}, if xi is set to false,
we select its positive literal players and construct a path
that consists of three edges {vi(1), xi(1)}, {xi(1), xi(2)},
and {xi(2), vi(2)}; similarly, if xi that is set to true, we
select its negative literal players and construct a path that
consists of three edges {vi(1), x¯i(1)}, {x¯i(1), x¯i(2)}, and
{x¯i(2), vi(2)}. We then create an edge {vi(2), vi+1(1)} for
each i ∈ [n], and merge the variable gadgets all together.
Finally, we construct a path over the rest of players,
by aligning the garbage collectors g1, g2, . . . , gk in increas-
ing order of their index, and putting one of the remaining
k− 1(= 4n−m− 2n) literal players into each consecutive
pair of garbage collectors arbitrarily. We then merge all the
paths by creating the four edges {s, c1(1)}, {cm(2), v1(1)},
{vn(2), g1}, and {gk, t}; see Figure 1 for an illustration. It
is easy to verify that the resulting graph is a path consistent
with the samples.
⇐=: Conversely, suppose that there is a path T ∗ =
〈N,E〉 consistent with 〈S, ℓ〉, i.e., for each S ∈ S, S
is connected in T ∗ if and only if S ∈ C. Since every
pair in C should be connected, the four pairs {s, c1(1)},
{cm(2), v1(1)},{vn(2), g1}, {gk, t} must form an edge in
T ∗. Similarly, we have {cj(2), cj+1(1)} ∈ E for each
j ∈ [m−1]; also, {vi(2), vi+1(1)} ∈ E for each i ∈ [n−1].
Observe that both players s and t must be the leaves of the
constructed path since these players are only allowed to have
one neighbor; thus, every other player has degree 2. Combin-
ing these observations, the definition of U3 ensures that our
path specifies a truth assignment forX .
Lemma 5.6. For each i ∈ [n], we have either
• {vi(1), xi(1)}, {xi(1), xi(2)}, {xi(2), vi(2)} ∈ E; or
• {vi(1), x¯i(1)}, {x¯i(1), x¯i(2)}, {x¯i(2), vi(2)} ∈ E.
Proof. Take any i ∈ [n]. Since each variable player vi(1) is
adjacent to vi−1(2), the other players who can be adjacent
to vi(1) are its literal players xi(1) and x¯i(1) due to the con-
strains in U2. First, if players vi(1) and xi(1) are adjacent,
the player xi(1) can be only adjacent to xi(2) since vi−1(2)
is already adjacent to vi(1), which then implies that xi(2)
can be only adjacent to vi(2) due to the constrains in U3.
Similarly, if vi(1) and x¯i(1) are adjacent, x¯i(1) can be only
adjacent to x¯i(2), which then can be only adjacent to vi(2).
This completes the proof.
Now take the truth assignment f that sets the variable xi
to true if and only if its negative literal players x¯i(1) and
x¯i(2) are adjacent to variable players vi(1) and vi(2). This
assignment can be easily seen to satisfy φ. Indeed, for each
clause cj ∈ C, the clause player cj(2) must be adjacent
to a literal player in cj , since each clause player cj(2) is
adjacent to cj−1(2) and the only other players who can be
adjacent to cj(2) are their literal players contained in it; such
a literal player corresponds to an occurrence appearing in the
assignment f and satisfies a clause cj .
To extend the above reduction to forests, given an instance
of (3,B2)-SAT, we create the same player setN and family
S as above together with additional constraints; specifically,
we indicate the two leaves s and t by forcing (n− 1)-player
coalitionsN \{s} andN \{t} to be connected, and all other
(n − 1)-player coalitions to be disconnected. Thus, if there
is a forest consistent with the samples, then it cannot have
more than two leaves, namely, the graph must be a path.
To conclude, if one allows observations of both connected
and disconnected components, finding a forest consistent
with samples is computationally intractable. We note that
this does not preclude the existence of efficient heuristics
computing consistent forest structures in practice: as pre-
viously mentioned, inferring PAC approximations of for-
est structures has a low communication complexity (Theo-
rem 5.1); thus, given access to strong MILP solvers, we be-
lieve that identifying consistent forest structures should be
easy in practice.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This work establishes a strong connection between interac-
tion structure and the ability to guarantee approximate sta-
bility in hedonic games; simply put, we show that if one
only knows the underlying interaction structure and noth-
ing more, then one can only obtain PAC stable outcomes
if the underlying interaction structure is very well-behaved,
i.e. a forest. This result seems to imply a natural trade-
off: our work assumes very little knowledge about underly-
ing player preferences, and thus requires a lot of structure;
Sliwinski and Zick (2017) make no assumptions on the un-
derlying interaction network, but assume a more restricted
player preference model. It would be interesting to explore
‘intermediate’ cases; that is, suppose we make some struc-
tural assumptions on the interaction network, what classes
of player preferences admit PAC stable outcomes?
We make use of tools from computational learning the-
ory in order to analyze hedonic coalition formation. We
believe that as a research paradigm, this is a useful and
important methodological approach. Hedonic games (and
cooperative games in general) have, by and large, seen
sparse application. Other game-theoretic methods have
been successfully applied by taking a problem-oriented ap-
proach (e.g. stable matching for resident-hospital allocation
(Kleinberg and Tardos 2006, Chapter 1.1), or Stackelberg
games in the security domain (Tambe 2011)); a concrete
problem modeled and solved by a hedonic game framework
has not yet been identified, to the best of our knowledge; this
is despite the wealth of potential application domains, and
rich data environments available nowadays (in particular, so-
cial network datasets would be particularly agreeable to the
type of analysis presented in this work). Our work makes a
fundamental connection between data, community structure,
and game-theoretic solution concepts; a connection that we
hope will result in a more applicable model of strategic col-
laborative behavior.
s c1(1) x1(1) c1(2) c2(1) x1(2) c2(2) c3(1) x¯2(1) c3(2) c4(1) x¯2(2) c4(2)
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Figure 1: Graph constructed for the formula φ = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x¯3) ∧ (x¯1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x¯3 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x¯3) in the
proof of Theorem 5.5. The formula is satisfied by the mapping f that assigns the opposite value to the literals connected to each
variable gadget Vi = {vi(1), vi(2)}, i.e., f(x1) = true, f(x2) = false, and f(x3) = false.
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